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Background: A metacognitive approach to the conceptualization of paranoia as a strategy 
for managing interpersonal threat has gained some support. This study reports the validation 
of the Beliefs about Paranoia Scale (BaPS), a self-report measure to assess metacognitive 
beliefs about paranoia, in a large clinical sample. We aimed to replicate the factor structure 
of the measure and to test the hypotheses that both positive and negative beliefs about 
paranoia would predict the severity of suspiciousness, and that the co-occurrence of positive 
and negative beliefs would predict increased suspiciousness.  
Method: A total of 335 patients meeting criteria for a schizophrenia spectrum disorder 
completed the Beliefs about Paranoia Scale (BaPS), and were administered the Positive and 
Negative Syndromes Scale (PANSS) and the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales 
(PSYRATS). 
Results: Three distinct subscales were measured by the BaPS (negative beliefs about 
paranoia, paranoia as a survival strategy and normalising beliefs) which replicated the 
intended factor structure. The scales had good internal consistency (alphas ranging from 
0.87 to 0.89) and were correlated with relevant items from the PANSS and PSYRATS. 
Ordinal regression showed that beliefs about paranoia as a survival strategy and negative 
beliefs about paranoia both predicted severity of suspiciousness. The co-occurrence of 
survival beliefs and negative beliefs about paranoia also predicted increased levels of 
suspiciousness. 
Conclusions:  All hypotheses were confirmed, suggesting that a metacognitive approach to 
the conceptualisation of paranoia as a strategy for managing interpersonal threat may have 
utility for understanding clinical paranoia. The clinical implications for interventions for 
paranoia are discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
Introduction 
Paranoia has been defined as ‘a disordered mode of thought that is dominated by an 
intense, irrational, but persistent mistrust or suspicion of people and a corresponding 
tendency to interpret the actions of others as deliberately threatening or demeaning’ 
(Fenigstein, 1984). Freeman and Garety (2000) have since defined paranoid ideation as the 
belief that harm is occurring or is going to occur, and that the persecutor has the intention to 
cause harm to the person. It is a frequent symptom of psychosis but paranoid thinking is also 
common in the general population (Freeman, 2007), which raises questions concerning the 
factors which contribute to more severe or clinical paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005). 
Paranoia can also be conceptualised as a response to a perception of interpersonal 
threat (Morrison et al., 2005). The self-regulatory model of psychological dysfunction (S-
REF) model (Wells and Matthews, 1994) provides a useful framework for understanding 
paranoia as a motivated response for managing threat, and the transition to perseverative 
and clinically distressing paranoia. According to the S-REF model, psychological distress is 
maintained by a pattern of responses called the ‘cognitive attentional syndrome’ (CAS) 
consisting of worry or rumination, fixation of attention on threat, and unhelpful coping 
behaviours. The CAS is controlled by metacognitive beliefs, including positive beliefs which 
drive more frequent use, and negative beliefs which result in distress and disability. The 
model predicts that the co-occurrence of positive and negative beliefs is especially 
problematic, leading to conflicts in self-regulation and a sense of loss of control over 
cognition and emotion. Applying these principles to a metacognitive model of paranoia, 
Morrison et al. (2011) outlined how paranoid thoughts could be engaged with or not, in a 
similar way to the model of worry in GAD (Wells, 1995). A trigger situation or event (e.g. 
going out and seeing a young male, or having an intrusive image of violence) could activate 
positive beliefs about paranoia as a method of coping with the perceived threat (e.g., ‘It is 
important to be alert for danger in order to survive’). This could then lead to specific paranoid 
thoughts (e.g., ‘That man is going to attack me’), and in turn, the activation of negative 
beliefs (e.g., ‘My paranoia is uncontrollable’) and castrophization (e.g., ‘I’m going mad and 
will end up in hospital again’), leading to emotional distress and attempts to control or avoid 
paranoia which may maintain the problem.  
There is increasing evidence for the role of metacognition in paranoia, which includes 
meta-worry about the uncontrollability of delusion relevant thoughts as being highly 
correlated with delusional distress, suggesting that the distress caused by a persecutory 
delusion is not simply due to the content of paranoid thoughts per se (Freeman and Garety, 
1999); positive and negative metacognitions being elevated among people with persecutory 
delusions (Morrison and Wells, 2003), and metacognitive beliefs being associated with 
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paranoid ideation in non-patient groups (Laroi and Van der Linden, 2005; Varese et al., 
2011) . However, these studies used general measures of metacognitive beliefs about worry 
and thoughts, such as the metacognitions questionnaire (Cartwright-Hatton and Wells, 
1997).  
Morrison et al. (2005) developed the Beliefs about Paranoia Scale (BaPS) to 
specifically assess metacognitive beliefs about paranoia. The measure revealed four 
subscales (negative beliefs about paranoia, positive beliefs about paranoia as a survival 
strategy, general positive beliefs and normalising beliefs) in a non-patient sample. 
Consistent with the metacognitive model, positive beliefs about paranoia as a survival 
strategy were associated with more frequent paranoid thoughts and negative beliefs were 
associated with distress due to delusional ideation. Gumley, Gillan, Morrison, and 
Schwannauer (2011) subsequently developed a brief 18-item version of the BaPS in a non-
patient sample, which had a three-factor structure (negative beliefs about paranoia, paranoia 
as a survival strategy, and normalizing beliefs). They found both negative beliefs and 
survival beliefs to be predictive of paranoia frequency and distress. The three-factor 
structure and good internal consistency of the 18-item BaPS has since been replicated in a 
sample of 122 patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia spectrum disorder (Morrison et al., 
2011). Survival beliefs were found to be associated with severity of suspiciousness, and 
negative beliefs were higher among those meeting diagnostic criteria for persecutory 
delusions. A comparison with a non-clinical control group also found that patients scored 
higher than non-patients on both survival and negative beliefs (Morrison et al., 2011). These 
studies provide increasing evidence for good psychometric properties of the BaPS and some 
support for a metacognitive model of paranoia. However, the clinical sample was of a 
relatively moderate size.  
The present study aimed to examine the psychometric properties of the BaPS in a 
larger clinical sample. This included an exploration of the factor structure of the BaPS and its 
associations with related items from the Positive and Negative Syndromes of Schizophrenia 
Scale (PANSS) and the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS) to assess 
concurrent validity and test theory-driven hypotheses. It was expected that the subscales of 
the BaPS would be replicated in the clinical sample, and that negative beliefs would be 
associated with distress due to delusional ideation. We hypothesised that both positive and 
negative beliefs about paranoia would predict suspiciousness ratings on the PANSS. As the 
metacognitive theory of paranoia posits that the co-occurrence of both positive and negative 
beliefs that results in problematic paranoia, we also hypothesised that these subscales 
would interact to predict higher severity of suspiciousness ratings on the PANSS. 
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Method 
Participants 
All participants were involved in research trials of cognitive therapy that incorporated the 
study measures during the baseline assessments. Two of the studies have been published 
(Morrison et al., 2014a; Morrison et al., 2014b) and the other trial was ongoing at the time of 
writing (FOCUS trial; ISRCT number 99672552). All participants met International 
Classification of Diseases–tenth revision (ICD-10) criteria for schizophrenia, schizoaffective 
disorder, or delusional disorder, or met entry criteria for an early intervention for psychosis 
service (operationally defined with the PANSS) to allow for diagnostic uncertainty in early 
phases of psychosis. 
 
Measures 
The Beliefs about Paranoia Scale (BaPS) is a self-report questionnaire developed to 
measure metacognitive processes involved in paranoia by measuring positive and negative 
beliefs about paranoia. It consists of a number of attitudes and thoughts that people have 
expressed about paranoia based on clinical knowledge of patients experiencing persecutory 
delusions (Morrison et al., 2005). Each item is scored on a 4-point scale to measure 
conviction (1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately so, 4 = very much). The revised 18 
item short-form version of the measure was developed in a non-clinical sample and was 
found to measure three factors of negative beliefs about paranoia, positive beliefs about 
paranoia as a survival strategy, and normalising beliefs (Gumley et al., 2011), which were 
replicated in a moderately sized clinical sample (Morrison et al., 2011).  
 
The positive and negative syndrome scale (PANSS) is a clinician-administered, thirty-item 
semi-structured interview assessing positive symptomatology, negative symptomatology and 
general psychopathology (Kay et al., 1987). The present study included four-items from the 
PANSS thought to be associated with the experience of paranoia. Two items were from the 
positive symptomatology subscale and included the ‘delusions’ item (defined as beliefs 
which are unfounded, unrealistic and idiosyncratic) and the ‘suspiciousness/persecution’ 
item (unrealistic or exaggerated ideas of persecution, as reflected in guardedness, a 
distrustful attitude, suspicious hypervigilance or frank delusions that others mean harm). The 
other two items were from the general psychopathology subscale and included ‘anxiety’ 
(subjective experience of nervousness, worry, apprehension or restlessness, ranging from 
excessive concern about the present or future to feelings of panic) and ‘active social 
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avoidance’ (diminished social involvement associated with unwarranted fear, hostility, or 
distrust). All items are scored between 1 (not present) and 7 (severe). 
 
The Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS, Haddock et al., 1999) is a clinician-
administered semi-structured interview assessing dimensions of auditory hallucinations and 
delusional beliefs. In the present study, the six items of the delusions scale were examined 
which included i) the amount of preoccupation with beliefs (time spent thinking about beliefs 
during the week) ii) duration of preoccupation with beliefs (how long the belief persists when 
it comes into their mind), iii) conviction in the beliefs (how convinced they are that the beliefs 
are true), iv) amount of distress (whether the beliefs cause distress and for how much of the 
time) v) intensity of distress (how severe the distress feels) and vi) disruption (whether the 
belief interferes with activities, self-care or relationships). All items are scored from 0 to 4, 
with higher scores showing more severe phenomena.  
 
Data analysis 
The data were analysed using SPSS version 19.0 (IBM, Released 2010). Principal 
components analysis was used to examine the factor structure of the BaPS in the clinical 
sample. Correlational analyses (Pearson’s r) were used to test for associations between the 
BaPS subscales and items from the PANSS and PSYRATS to assess concurrent validity. 
Differences in the mean BaPS subscale scores (t-test) were also examined for those with a 
score of 1 to 4 on the suspiciousness / persecution item on the PANSS versus a score of 5 
(‘Moderate Severe’) or above. This cut-off point was chosen as consistent with one of the 
criteria for defining the presence of psychosis for entry into clinical trials (whereby all 
participants must score at least 4 on PANSS delusions or hallucinations, or at least 5 on 
suspiciousness or persecution, conceptual disorganisation, or grandiosity).  
 
Since the PANSS suspiciousness / persecution item was an ordinal outcome variable, the 
predictive relationships between the BaPS subscales and this outcome were examined 
using ordinal logistic regression. The subscale scores were standardized (z-scores) for ease 
of interpretation of the odds ratios. To test the hypothesis that negative and positive beliefs 
would interact to predict PANSS suspiciousness / persecution, the ordinal logistic regression 
model included the standardized subscale scores for negative beliefs, positive beliefs and 
the product term of these two variables. The assumption of proportional odds was met for 
the ordinal regression models (showing that the effect of the explanatory variables was 
consistent across each level of the ordinal outcome variable). 
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Results 
 
Sample 
The number of participants completing the BaPS and PANSS measures was 335. The 
majority also completed the PSYRATS (n = 322, 91%). The mean age of the group was 40.6 
years (SD=11.7; range 17–73 years), 66.8% of participants were male and 91.5% were of 
White ethnicity, with the remainder being from Black (5.2%), Asian (2.7%) and other ethnic 
groups (0.6%). The mean total PANSS score of the sample was 79.2 (SD 13.7), which 
equates to a ‘moderately’ ill population on average (Leucht et al., 2005). 
 
Factor structure of the BaPS 
Principal components analysis (n = 335) was conducted to examine the factor structure of 
the BaPS in the clinical sample. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic was greater than 
0.88 (‘great’ according to Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999) which confirms the adequacy of 
the sample for the analysis, and all KMO values for individual items were above 0.85 which 
exceeds the acceptable limit of 0.5.  Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 (153) = 3463, p < 0.001, 
showed that the correlations between items was sufficiently large for principal components 
analysis. The number of components to extract was determined by the use of parallel 
analysis, which compares the actual eigenvalues from the data with eigenvalues derived 
from random, parallel datasets (O'Connor, 2000). Three components were extracted 
according to the criterion of the eigenvalues being larger than those at the 95th percentile of 
the random datasets. These components were then subjected to varimax rotation. Table 1 
shows the item loadings on the three components of ‘survival strategy’, ‘negative beliefs’ and 
‘normalising beliefs’, which were consistent with the intended factor structure. Cronbach’s 
alpha for each subscale was 0.87, 0.88 and 0.89 respectively and was 0.88 for the overall 
scale, which shows good internal consistency.  
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Table 1. Factor loadings of the BaPS using varimax rotation  
  Loadings on factors 
Item / Scale 1 2 3 
    
Factor 1: Survival strategy    
It is important to be paranoid 0.76 0.02 0.11 
If I were not paranoid others would take advantage of me 0.70 0.24 0.05 
It is safer to be paranoid 0.76 0.10 0.12 
My paranoia keeps me on my toes 0.78 0.19 0.19 
Being paranoid keeps me sharp 0.76 0.13 0.22 
My paranoia protects me 0.80 0.09 0.16 
    
Factor 2: Negative beliefs    
My paranoia gets out of control 0.14 0.80 -0.01 
I get upset when I feel paranoid 0.08 0.85 0.07 
My paranoia prevents me from doing things I enjoy 0.12 0.79 0.06 
My paranoid thoughts worry me 0.12 0.86 0.08 
My paranoia gets exaggerated 0.26 0.50 0.21 
My paranoia distresses me 0.07 0.86 0.05 
    
Factor 3: Normalising beliefs    
Everybody feels paranoid at some time or other 0.08 0.21 0.77 
Most people get paranoid sometimes 0.05 0.24 0.79 
Paranoia is normal 0.30 -0.06 0.65 
Everybody is paranoid on some level 0.12 0.05 0.85 
Paranoia is something everybody has to some extent 0.10 0.07 0.88 
Being paranoid is just human nature 0.28 -0.07 0.71 
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Concurrent validity 
Correlations between the BaPS subscales and items from the PANSS measuring delusions, 
suspiciousness/persecution, anxiety and active social avoidance are shown in Table 2. 
Significant associations were observed for BaPS total score and all four PANSS items. The 
survival beliefs subscale was correlated with all items and the negative beliefs subscale with 
three of the four items (with the exception being the delusions item). Normalising beliefs 
were not correlated with any of the PANSS items.  
Table 2. Correlations between the BaPS and PANSS items 
 
PANSS Item 
  
Delusions Suspiciousness 
/ persecution 
Anxiety Social 
avoidance 
     
Total BAPS 
score 
0.150** 0.279** 0.309** 0.199** 
     
Survival strategy 0.157** 0.220** 0.177** 0.188** 
     
Negative beliefs 0.085 0.319** 0.424** 0.306** 
     
Normalising 
beliefs 
0.093 0.066 0.059 -0.071 
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Table 3 shows the mean BaPS subscale scores among those classified as having moderate 
to severe scores on the PANSS suspiciousness/persecution item (5 or above) versus lower 
scores. Significant differences were observed for the BaPS total score as well as the survival 
and negative beliefs subscale, suggesting the ability of the measure to distinguish between 
the two groups. 
Table 3.  Mean BaPS scores among lower versus higher scorers on the PANSS 
suspiciousness/persecution item 
  
PANSS 
suspiciousness < 5 
PANSS 
suspiciousness 5 + 
p-value 
  Mean (sd) Mean (sd)   
 
Total BaPS score 37.64 (9.99) 41.79 (11.12) <.001** 
    
Survival strategy 9.43 (3.63) 11.14 (5.17) .001* 
    
Negative beliefs 14.66 (5.25) 17.19 (5.06) <.001** 
    
Normalising beliefs 13.54 (4.73) 13.46 (4.80) .877 
        
 
Significant correlations were also observed between the BaPS survival and negative beliefs 
subscales and the PSYRATS delusions subscale (Table 4). The PSYRATS items measuring 
the amount and intensity of distress had larger correlations with the BaPS negative beliefs. 
Both survival beliefs and negative beliefs about paranoia were correlated with the PSYRATS 
duration of preoccupation item.  
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Table 4. Correlations between the BaPS and PSYRATS items 
 PSYRATS Item from the delusions subscale 
 
Amount of 
preoccupation 
Duration of 
preoccupation 
Conviction Amount of 
distress 
Intensity of 
distress 
Disruption Subscale 
total 
        
Total BAPS 
score 
0.085 0.150** 0.114* 0.263** 0.262** 0.089 0.226** 
        
Survival 
strategy 
0.109 0.123* 0.137* 0.140* 0.180** 0.147** 0.166** 
        
Negative 
beliefs 
0.069 0.167** 0.063 0.373** 0.326** 0.082 0.270** 
        
Normalising 
beliefs 
0.010 0.037 0.055 0.044 0.058 -0.033 0.052 
        
 
Predictive validity 
BaPS negative and survival beliefs both predicted PANSS suspiciousness ratings 
independently of one another when entered together with normalising beliefs in a 
multivariate ordinal logistic regression model (Table 5). These findings remained significant 
after adding PANSS anxiety and depression scores to the model: the odds ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals for survival and negative beliefs were 1.06 (1.01, 1.12), p = 0.001 and 
1.08 (1.03, 1.13), p = 0.012 respectively. Furthermore, as hypothesised, the co-occurrence 
of negative and survival beliefs predicted greater severity of PANSS suspiciousness as 
shown by the significant interaction term (Table 6). The entry of the interaction term removed 
the effect of the negative and survival subscales as independent predictors of PANSS 
suspiciousness. The interaction term also remained significant after controlling for PANSS 
anxiety and depression (OR 1.01, 95% CI 1.00 to 1.02, p = 0.024). 
Table 5. BaPS subscales as predictors of PANSS suspiciousness / persecution  
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% CI  p-value 
 
Survival beliefs 
Negative beliefs 
Normalising beliefs 
 
1.07 
1.10 
0.97 
 
1.02, 1.12 
1.06, 1.15 
0.93, 1.02 
 
.007* 
<.001** 
.225 
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Table 6. Interaction between survival and negative beliefs on PANSS 
suspiciousness/persecution  
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% CI  p-value 
 
Survival beliefs 
Negative beliefs 
Survival by negative beliefs 
 
 
0.89 
1.00 
1.01 
 
0.76, 1.04 
0.92, 1.09 
1.00, 1.02 
 
.132 
.948 
.021* 
 
Figure 1 details the nature of the interaction, showing that survival beliefs were only 
associated with PANSS suspiciousness when negative beliefs were simultaneously high. 
The correlation coefficients between survival beliefs and PANSS suspiciousness for the 
different levels of negative beliefs (split by percentiles of 33.3) were r = -0.02, p = 0.836 for 
low negative beliefs, r = 0.146, p = 0.136 for moderate negative beliefs and r = 0.308, p = 
0.001 for high negative beliefs). 
 
Figure 1. Scatterplot of BaPS survival beliefs versus PANSS suspiciousness, grouped by 
BaPS negative beliefs 
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Discussion 
Main findings 
The BaPS was found to measure three distinct subscales of beliefs about paranoia in a 
clinical sample. These subscales of survival, negative and normalising beliefs replicated the 
intended factor structure and had good internal consistency. The BaPS measure was 
correlated with anxiety and suspiciousness items from the PANSS and the PSYRATS 
delusions subscale which suggests concurrent validity. Negative beliefs about paranoia were 
correlated with delusional distress on the PSYRATS as expected. Our hypotheses that 
survival (positive beliefs) and negative beliefs about paranoia would both predict 
suspiciousness ratings on the PANSS were supported. Moreover, the co-occurrence of 
survival and negative beliefs was found to predict higher PANSS suspiciousness ratings, 
which is consistent with a metacognitive conceptualisation of paranoia. 
Findings in relation to previous studies 
The three subscales of the BaPS replicates two previous studies of the 18-item version of 
the measure (Gumley et al., 2011; Morrison et al., 2011) which suggests reliability of its 
factor structure. The finding that both survival beliefs and negative beliefs about paranoia 
were predictive of the severity of suspiciousness provides additional support for the 
metacognitive model of paranoia (Morrison et al., 2011). This model outlines how positive 
metabeliefs represent motivation to engage with paranoia as a cognitive attentional 
response for coping with perceived interpersonal threat, and how negative metabeliefs 
regarding perceived uncontrollability or harmfulness results in clinically distressing paranoia. 
The findings are consistent with previous tests of the measure in a smaller clinical sample 
(Morrison et al., 2011) and non-patient groups (Gumley et al., 2011; Morrison et al., 2005). 
They also add to a growing body of evidence for the role of metacognition in paranoia 
(Freeman and Garety, 1999; Laroi and Van der Linden, 2005; Morrison and Wells, 2003; 
Varese et al., 2011). 
 
A novel finding of the present study was our support for the hypothesis that the co-
occurrence of positive and negative beliefs about paranoia would predict more severe 
suspiciousness on the PANSS. The interaction of these metabeliefs predicted the severity of 
suspiciousness over and above their independent effect, such that survival beliefs only 
predicted suspiciousness when negative beliefs were simultaneously high. This suggests 
that positive beliefs about paranoia as a survival strategy are normal to a degree and not 
clinically problematic per se, perhaps representing paranoia as an evolved or learnt 
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response for coping with threat. It appears that only when the paranoia is concurrently 
experienced as uncontrollable, distressing or interfering with other aspects of the person’s 
life, that it reaches higher levels of clinical severity. According to a metacognitive 
conceptualisation, this co-occurrence of positive and negative beliefs is said to have a 
causal role in clinical distress due to contributing to a self-regulatory conflict (Wells, 1995). In 
the metacognitive model of paranoia (Morrison et al., 2011) this includes conflicting motives 
to engage with paranoid thinking and threat monitoring, versus motives to avoid or suppress 
paranoia. The latter promotes cognitive and behavioural control attempts (such as social 
avoidance, thought suppression and substance misuse) which may lead to vicious 
maintenance cycles which increase the experience of uncontrollability, disruption and 
consequent distress. Regarding previous studies, a similar interaction hypothesis has been 
examined as a predictor of patient status (Morrison et al., 2011). This earlier BaPS study did 
not find that the co-occurrence of positive and negative beliefs about paranoia predicted a 
diagnosis of a psychotic disorder versus non-patients, though the outcome may have been 
too general as opposed to the specific prediction of persecutory delusions. The results of the 
present study are more likely to be reliable, since the measurement of paranoia is more 
comprehensive (using PANSS for the whole sample), and the sample size is considerably 
larger. 
 
Limitations 
A strength of the study is the large clinical sample; however, a number of limitations require 
consideration. The cross-sectional design prevents inferences of causality with respect to 
testing the model. The metacognitive model outlines how positive and negative metabeliefs 
contribute to the initial development of paranoia, but they could also develop as 
consequence of paranoia. For example, positive beliefs could reflect a view of paranoia as 
necessary given the seriousness of the perceived threat, and negative metabeliefs can also 
result from the distress and disruption caused by paranoia. Longitudinal or experimental 
designs are, therefore, required to delineate the precise direction of effects. However, the 
metacognitive model does account for bi-directional effects in that additional negative beliefs 
and catastrophisation about paranoia are said to result from appraisal of its distressing 
consequences, which motivate further unhelpful responses and perpetuate paranoia 
(Morrison et al., 2011). Therefore, even if such metabeliefs primarily arise as a result of 
paranoia, they are still likely to have a role in its maintenance and are still a potential target 
for intervention.  
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Another limitation is that the main outcome measure for severity of suspiciousness was a 
single item from the PANSS rather than a designated measure of paranoia. However, all 
staff received training and supervision regarding use of the PANSS and inter-rater reliability 
was performed (the intra-class correlation coefficients for the cognitive therapy trials with 
more than one rater were 0·83, SD 0·12 (Morrison et al., 2014b) and 0.8, SD 0.07 for the 
ongoing FOCUS trial). The PANSS suspiciousness/persecution item is rated according to 
symptom severity and disruption, and was included as a measure of clinical paranoia which 
combined aspects of frequency and distress. It may have been of interest to examine 
specific outcomes of paranoia frequency versus paranoia distress, but the theorised 
relationships between positive metabeliefs and paranoia frequency and negative metabeliefs 
and distress have been previously shown in non-clinical samples (Gumley et al., 2011; 
Morrison et al., 2011), and the expected relationship between negative beliefs and 
delusional distress was also shown in the present clinical sample. 
  
The metacognitive model does not specifically address the role of normalising beliefs in 
paranoia, and as with the previous studies of the BaPS, normalising beliefs were not 
associated with severity of suspiciousness or dimensions of delusional beliefs. These were 
included in the measure because they could be viewed as beliefs that should increase as a 
result of normalising interventions in cognitive therapy, and they may be functional in terms 
of reducing feelings of shame and increasing willingness to engage with cognitive 
interventions. However, further research is required to assess the sensitivity of the BaPS 
subscales to therapeutic change.  
 
Clinical implications 
When working with people experiencing distressing paranoia it would be important to assess 
for positive and negative metabeliefs; for example, by exploring the perceived advantages 
and disadvantages of paranoia, including the experience of uncontrollability. This could be 
done verbally or using our questionnaire. It appears unlikely that people would be motivated 
to reduce their paranoia if they viewed it as necessary for survival; therefore, it may be 
important to help the person find other ways to increase their sense of personal safety or 
replace other positive functions before commencing work to reduce paranoia. As described 
by Morrison and colleagues (2011), a shared view should also be formed about the accuracy 
of their paranoia, particularly as many patients have had life experiences that promote a 
paranoid world-view and positive beliefs about the necessity of paranoia. Acknowledging this 
historically, perhaps by developing a longitudinal formulation (e.g. Morrison, 2001), may 
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benefit engagement whilst also highlighting the importance of examining the accuracy of 
their paranoia in relation to current context. If the person holds catastrophic beliefs about 
paranoia, which are contributing to distress, these could be examined using cognitive 
techniques and behavioural experiments similar to strategies outlined to modify negative 
beliefs about worry (Wells, 1997). The provision of normalising information on the common 
frequency of paranoid thoughts (Freeman et al., 2005) and information about famous people 
who are known to experience paranoia may also help to reduce feelings of stigma 
associated with paranoia.  
 
As an alternative to working with the content of paranoid thoughts, there may also be utility 
in intervening in the process of paranoia as a motivated response to the initial perception of 
threat, using metacognitive therapy (e.g. Wells, 2008). This may be useful when the person 
finds the uncontrollability of paranoia as more problematic than the conviction in their 
thoughts. This could involve a focus on reducing preservative processing (worry and 
rumination), threat monitoring and self-focused attention, as well as replacing unhelpful 
behavioural or thought control strategies with more adaptive ways of responding to thoughts.  
Specific strategies include detached mindfulness, attention training and worry / rumination 
postponement (Wells, 2008). A recent exploratory trial using metacognitive therapy for 
psychosis found evidence of acceptability and clinically significant symptom change 
(Morrison et al., 2014a), although further research is required to evaluate metacognitive 
therapy for psychosis. 
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